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César Chávez and Egalitarian Ethics: Lessons from a Contradictory Legacy
Jeremy V. Cruz
St. John’s University

Introduction
This article analyzes the context and content of the egalitarian moral vision of César
Chávez, co-founder of the United Farm Workers of America (UFW), whose labor organizing
activities and speeches are, I argue, a vital and underappreciated part of the U.S. Catholic moral
tradition in the 20th century. Further, this analysis recognizes the UFW—and its associated
embryonic organizations—as “sacraments” or mediations of Chávez’s moral vision because,
through the UFW, Chávez and other social agents transformed U.S. social life. By situating
Chávez within Christian ethics generally and Catholic social ethics in particular, I also seek to
identify descriptive and moral claims concerning U.S. political-economic inequalities.1
While several Christian ethicists have considered Chávez’s importance for Christian virtue
ethics and social ethics, I believe that this is worthwhile time for ethicists to revive analysis and

1

Keeping in mind that the UFW was co-founded by Dolores Huerta, it would be prudent to ask,
“Why attend to César Chávez but not Dolores Huerta?” Certainly, Huerta’s UFW leadership has
not received the scholarly and popular attention that Chávez’s has garnered. However, Dolores
Huerta’s distance from Christian thought and practice during her time in union leadership makes
her praxis a less pertinent object of study in an article about the Catholic social tradition in the
U.S. Moreover, according to sociologist and former UFW board member Marshall Ganz, the
union’s decision-making structures and ethos (a focal point in this paper) were established by
Chávez much more than by Huerta, whose impact within the union was more closely tied to her
role as a labor contract negotiator. Marshall Ganz, interview by Jeremy Cruz and Sheila
McMahon, via Skype, February 4, 2011. Ganz’s brief narrative concerning the establishment of
the Farm Workers Association (FWA) and National Farm Workers Association (NFWA) also
centers on Chávez: Marshall Ganz, Why David Sometimes Wins: Leadership, Organization, and
Strategy in the California Farm Worker Movement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 89.
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assessment of Chávez’s legacy, in dialogue with other scholarly disciplines.2 First, the human
horrors that Chávez dedicated his life to resisting within the sector of U.S. agriculture remain
with us and, in much of the country, have worsened. Second, recent histories of the UFW have
been less favorable in their depictions and assessments of Chávez’s leadership, compared to
earlier works on Chávez’s life; this warrants careful attention and consideration from anyone
who draws upon Chávez’s life for inspiration or for normative purposes.3 Third, racist and antiimmigrant groups have seized upon recent scholarly critiques of Chávez and upon instances
where Chávez himself deployed anti-immigrant rhetoric, in order to justify political-economic

2

In texts surveying the history of U.S. Christian ethics, Chávez has mostly been ignored or, on
rare occasion, regarded as a “doer” (but not an innovative thinker) of Christian praxis. This
article seeks to situate Chávez more firmly within Catholic social ethics specifically. An analysis
of works by Christian ethicists who have studied or made use of Chávez’s thought is not the aim
of this article. Nevertheless, several works are worthy of note: Donovan Orman Roberts, "Theory
and Practice in the Life and Thought of César E. Chávez: Implications for a Social Ethic," (Ph.D.
Diss., Boston University, 1978); Carlos R. Piar, "César Chávez and La Causa: Toward a
Hispanic Christian Social Ethic,” The Annual of the Society of Christian Ethics, 16 (1996): 103120; Frederick John Dalton, The Moral Vision of César Chávez (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 2003);
Kevin O’Brien, “La Causa and Environmental Justice: César Chávez as a Resource for Christian
Ecological Ethics,” Journal of the Society of Christian Ethics 32, no. 1 (2012). Additionally,
several theologians and religious studies scholars, some cited in this text, have recognized
Chávez’s importance for contemporary Christian praxis.
This article will rely most heavily upon Marshall Ganz’s Why David Sometimes Wins, an
insider account of UFW leadership that shows little interest in critiquing Chávez’s personal
character and that provides a theory of effective social organizing, drawing upon both Chávez’s
successes and his failures. Additionally, journalist Miriam Pawel published two books assessing
Chávez's leadership, expanding upon shorter critiques that she began publishing in the 1980s:
Miriam Pawel, The Union of Their Dreams: Power, Hope, and Struggle in César Chávez’s Farm
Worker Movement (New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2009) and Miriam Pawel, The Crusades of
César Chávez: A Biography (New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2014). Similar critiques are detailed
in Frank Bardacke’s Trampling Out the Vintage: César Chávez and the Two Souls of the United
Farm Workers (London: Verso, 2011) and in Matthew Garcia’s From the Jaws of Victory: The
Triumph and Tragedy of César Chávez and the Farm Worker Movement (Berkeley: University
of California Press, 2012).
3
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agendas that Chávez himself opposed during his lifetime.4 Fourth, the field of theological ethics
has not given enough sustained attention to Chávez’s intellectual and practical contributions,
significantly overshadowed by scholars engaging Chávez’s life from other disciplinary
perspectives.5 Thus, I aim to situate Chávez firmly among those concerned with Christian social
ethics, which enables an adequate appreciation of the structural/institutional aspects of his ethical
thought (in contrast to a personal virtue-centered approach) and in hopes that we will assess and
learn from both his achievements and his failings with mindfulness of the web of communal and
societal relationships that shaped his thought and actions.
I argue that Chávez understood equality as an indispensable element of social justice yet
4

In one highly symbolic instance, Texas Congressman Louie Gohmert introduced a resolution in
the House of Representatives in 2018 seeking to declare César Chávez’s birthday “National
Border Control Day.” Rafael Bernal, “Hispanic Caucus Lashes out at Gohmert over César
Chávez Comments,” The Hill, March 21, 2018, https://thehill.com/latino/379533-hispaniccaucus-lashes-out-at-gohmert-over-César-Chávez-comments.
For example, Chávez is not referenced at all in Charles E. Curran’s Catholic Moral Theology in
the United States: A History (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2008). Decades
earlier, Curran named Chávez among exemplars of Christian nonviolent resistance, but provided
no discussion of noteworthy ethical contributions, in American Catholic Social Ethics:
Twentieth-Century Approaches (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1982). In Gary
Dorrien’s Social Ethics in the Making: Interpreting an American Tradition (Chichester: Wiley
Blackwell, 2010), Chávez is referenced once in 691 pages, but not to discuss any contributions to
Christian praxis. By comparison, Chávez’s contributions receive greater consideration from
historians documenting Latinx Catholicism. Two noteworthy examples are Moises Sandoval, On
The Move: A History of the Hispanic Church in the United States (Maryknoll: Orbis Books,
1990) and Timothy Matovina and Gerald E. Poyo, eds., ¡Presente! U.S. Latino Catholics from
Colonial Origins to the Present (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 2000). However, Chávez’s
contributions to religious morality and his influence upon academic thought are much more
apparent in introductions to Chicanx studies generally, and to Chicanx religious studies in
particular. See Rodolfo F. Acuña, The Making of Chicana/o Studies: In the Trenches of Academe
(New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2011) and Mario T. García, Católicos: Resistance
and Affirmation in Chicano Catholic History (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2008).
Additionally, an entire chapter is dedicated to Chávez’s religious praxis in Gastón Espinosa and
Mario T. García, eds., Mexican American Religions: Spirituality, Activism, and Culture
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2008). In this book, Espinosa credits Chávez’s 1968 speech
“The Mexican American and the Church” with being “the spark that helped ignite the field” of
Mexican American religious studies. Espinosa and García, Mexican American Religions, 23.
5
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interpreted “equality” in a variety of overlapping and sometimes conflicting ways. In other
words, César Chávez understood equality as a multi-dimensional social goal and considered it a
core element of social justice. Chávez regularly objected to vast disparities in the possession of
or access to basic goods necessary for sustaining the human body. At other times, his objections
to inequality pointed to disparities in human freedoms between racial or economic groups, such
as disparities of control over one’s labor or over determining its market value. Identifying causes
of these disparities, Chávez and the UFW also objected to unequal civil rights, such as rights
concerning worker association and union representation, rights that most U.S. workers enjoyed
but that were denied to farm workers. Still further, Chávez resisted attempts to denigrate and
erase the cultural and religious language and symbolism of marginalized workers. These varying
forms of egalitarian concern—material, freedom-centered, rights-focused, cultural-symbolic—
were generally understood by Chávez as complex and related social realities and were linked to
his broader understanding of injustice, which was commonly expressed through themes like
bodily deprivation, racist ideology and culture, and the instrumentalization of human labor
through institutionally-structured power. Additionally, for a time, Chávez viewed equality
between persons, at the hyper-local level, as an instrumental means to the achievement of
equalities in the wider society. This practical insight and lessons learned from his advocacy in
this regard contribute to an emphasis on the importance of political-economic equality not only
as a proper moral end to pursue through social action, but also as a proper and effective means to
this goal.
Furthermore, I argue that César Chávez embodied a race-conscious and trans-state
(transnational) approach to class conflict and social transformation, contributing to “popular”
Catholic social ethics by enacting and articulating an egalitarian vision of social life that

4
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responds to both the racial and the political status (citizenship) dimensions of capitalism (i.e., the
structure of economic production), which enabled the UFW to achieve successes in undermining
poverty and related socio-political inequalities. I arrive at these conclusions by considering
Chávez’s implicit and explicit responses to the following methodological questions:6 1) Why is
social inequality7 harmful and morally objectionable? (Why is equality a social obligation?) 2)
What particular types and levels of inequality are harmful and morally objectionable?
(Specifically, what equalities are morally desirable?) 3) Who ought to be included in or excluded
from prescriptive efforts to ensure equality? Put differently, toward whom should wealth and
power redistribution be directed and from whose resources should they be taken? (Equality
between whom?) 4) How ought equalization to be achieved?8
This article begins with a summary of the socio-historical context of California farm
worker organizing, out of which Chávez and other UFW leaders comprehended and responded to
U.S. social inequalities. The second section summarizes César Chávez’s familial context,
indicating recognition that social context largely conditions and limits the content of one’s social
and moral vision. The third section of the article analyzes the contours of Chávez’s social vision,
which was foundational to the UFW’s institutional structure and to Chávez’s own actions. The
fourth section of the article provides an analysis of the UFW’s successes in transforming U.S.
6

A full analysis of the egalitarian and pragmatic social morality of César Chávez lies beyond the
scope of this paper. The aim here is to sketch the basic contours of his egalitarian social vision.
7

Throughout this article I use social equality as an umbrella term for various forms of equality:
political, economic, racial, gendered, etc. Here, “social,” is not used in distinction to these
various categories. Alternatively, I will often use political-economic equality to signify the
centrality and mutually interwoven character of politics and economics.
8

The source of the trivalent distinction between descriptive, normative, and prescriptive
egalitarian analyses, which frames this article’s approach, is Anna Kasafi Perkins, Justice as
Equality: Michael Manley’s Caribbean Vision of Justice (New York: Peter Lang Publishing,
2010).
5
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social systems in a more egalitarian direction. Consideration is given to the ways in which the
UFW’s institutional structure enabled these successes, followed by discussion of the ways in
which changes to that institutional structure led to the UFW’s eventual decline as an agent of
egalitarian social change. The article concludes by proposing a shift in how Chávez’s life is
drawn upon as a source for Christian ethics, urging greater attention to lessons embedded in
Chávez’s personal failings as a leader and, more importantly, to morally instructive communal
failure.
California Agriculture: A Brief Pre-History of the UFW (1850-1962)
In contrast to the smaller “family farms” commonly imagined by U.S. Americans, from
its very beginnings, the California agricultural industry was characterized by “factories in the
field,” large-scale enterprises that were dependent upon large numbers of seasonal workers;
California’s agricultural enterprises often hired thousands of workers to labor on tens of
thousands of acres.9 This “agribusiness” system functioned within the larger social order
produced by U.S. settler colonization and violent incorporation of Alta California, which
included increasingly capitalist forms of agricultural production.10 Sociologist and former UFW
organizer Marshall Ganz recounts how these large-scale enterprises developed following the
forced cession of this Mexican territory in 1848, a primary goal of U.S. military intervention:
Large-scale farming was a legacy of the way public lands were privatized after
California became a state in 1850. Because they were exempted from the
The term “factories in the field” was popularized by lawyer and journalist Carey McWilliams,
whose 1939 book Factories in the Field: The Story of Migratory Farm Labor in California
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1939) detailed California agribusiness and was published within months
of John Steinbeck’s The Grapes of Wrath.
9

10

For a historical account of U.S. colonization and annexation of Alta California, see Rodolfo F.
Acuña, Occupied America: A History of Chicanos, 7th ed. (Boston: Pearson, 2010).
6
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Homestead Act, which would have broken the land into family farms of no more
than 160 acres, some 35 million acres—one-third of the state’s total area—had
been sold off in large units by 1880.11
Wealthy U.S. landowners soon shifted from raising cattle to other forms of farming, as the latter
became more profitable as a result of the new transcontinental railroad, expanded irrigation
facilities, and newly available capital to invest in agriculture production technologies.12 Politicaleconomic inequalities between landowners and agricultural workers proliferated rapidly and
continuously, as landowners became increasingly organized and cooperative with one another.
Successfully organizing farm workers required overcoming intersecting structural,
material, and cultural-ideological challenges. Included among these challenges were legalized
racial inequality and segregation (along with intergenerational legacies of white supremacist
violence), legal exclusions from labor rights, agribusiness owners’ ability to control or
circumvent U.S. immigration policy, and the significant influence of land and agribusiness
owners in all levels and branches of the U.S. state.13 For example, when many categories of U.S.
workers gained new legal protections and empowerments through the Depression-era labor
legislation of the 1930s, agricultural workers (along with domestic workers) were excluded.14
Most significantly, the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 did not protect farm workers’

11

Marshall Ganz, Why David Sometimes Wins, 24.

12

Ganz, 24.

13

Ganz, 23-51. For more lengthy analysis of California agricultural history, see Lawrence J.
Jelinek, Harvest Empire: A History of California Agriculture, 2nd ed. (Boston: Heinle & Heinle,
1982).
14

Ganz, Why David Sometimes Wins, 38.
7
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freedom of association or their freedom to bargain collectively for contracts, a form of inequality
in U.S. federal law that exists to this day.15
These New Deal exclusions perpetuated white supremacy and capitalist dominance, key
functions of U.S. labor law. Black people constituted the majority of farm and domestic workers
in the South, as did Mexicans/Mexican-Americans, Filipinxs, and people from other Asian
countries working in these sectors in California: thus, these groups overwhelmingly bore the
disproportionate impact of excluding farm and domestic workers from constitutionallyguaranteed labor rights.16 Further, agribusiness owners were able to suppress worker-organizing
efforts through their influence over U.S. immigration policy while leveraging wartime and
consumer sentiments, which enabled land and agribusiness owners to control the size and market
value of the available labor pool of immigrant farm workers to achieve their financial interests.17

15

Most of these federal exclusions from labor rights are replicated in state constitutions. Recent
campaigns have experienced some successes in amending state constitutions to grant equal labor
rights to domestic workers. The National Domestic Workers Alliance and its allies won passage
of the Domestic Workers Bill of Rights in New York (2010), followed by Hawaii (2013) and
California (2014). Similarly, the Justice for Farmworkers Campaign, a diverse coalition of
organizations, is currently advancing the Farmworkers Fair Labor Practices Act in the New York
state legislature. If passed, this bill would remove farmworker exclusions from labor rights
granted by the state constitution. In 1975, via the California Agricultural Labor Relations Act
(CALRA), California became the first state in the U.S. to grant farm workers the right to
associate and to collectively bargain for labor contracts, as a direct result of the advocacy
campaigns by the UFW and its allies.
16

Margaret Gray, Labor and the Locavore: The Making of a Comprehensive Food Ethic
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2014), 49. See also Ganz, Why David Sometimes Wins,
37-38, and Dalton, The Moral Vision of César Chávez, 24-25.
17

Ganz, Why David Sometimes Wins, 5.

8
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Nevertheless, California farm workers rejected this “coloniality of power,”18 along with
the deprivation, suffering, and premature deaths it produced. Prior to the UFW, there were three
distinct periods of California farm worker organizing (1900-1919, 1933-1942, 1946-1951). Each
of these periods of intensive labor organizing unfolded following reductions in available farm
labor, which created opportunities for farm workers, if well organized, to make more effective
demands on their employers.19 Ganz recounts the history of these three periods of possibility,
during which well-organized land and agribusiness owners repeatedly crushed attempts by farm
workers to organize, often by deploying violent force: “From 1900 to 1950 three waves of farm
worker organizing attempts failed to win a single multiyear contract, establish a sustainable farm
workers union, or reform the rules governing the farm labor market.”20 Thus, prior to the UFW
and its associated precursor organizations, localized and insufficiently networked attempts to
organize California farm workers for better compensation and working conditions achieved only
minimal and short-lived successes.
After the short third wave of organizing that followed World War II, nearly a decade
passed before any viable opportunities for successful farm worker organizing reemerged in
California. The next opportunities came in the 1960s, when new possibilities to mobilize labor

The term “coloniality of power,” coined by the late Peruvian sociologist Aníbal Quijano,
describes the intersecting institutional legacies, practices, and modes of knowing associated with
Eurocentric colonial power, which endure beyond formal decolonization or formal integration
and which become integrated into the racialized social orders of post-colonies. Aníbal Quijano,
“Coloniality of Power, Eurocentrism, and Latin America,” in Coloniality at Large: Latin
America and the Postcolonial Debate (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008), 181–224.
18

19

Ganz, Why David Sometimes Wins, 23.

20

Ganz, 51-52.
9
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support within state institutions emerged and when the gradual ending of the bracero program21
again shrank the farm labor market. Significant and long-term farm worker organizing successes
finally came with the United Farm Workers of America, which began in 1962 as the Asociación
de Trabajadores Campesinos, or Farm Workers Association (FWA), under the leadership of
César Chávez and Dolores Huerta.22 Ethnic leaders, far-left radicals, and the AFL-CIO gradually
joined in a common endeavor coordinated by the UFW, the first time that these historically
competing groups had successfully united. Amid the civil rights struggles of the 1960s, the UFW
enhanced its public demands for economic justice with appeals to racial justice, while also
challenging longstanding ethno-racial and ideological barriers to cooperation within the labor
movement itself.23 The UFW and its leaders were shaped within this social context, marked by
the anti-racist mobilizations of the 1960s and by a long tradition of farm worker resistance to a
racialized social order rooted deeply in the colonial soil of California.
César Chávez: Chicanx Familial Roots of a Catholic Social Ethic
In his analysis of the UFW, Ganz convincingly argues that it was the “strategic capacity”
drawn from persons and institutional arrangements within the UFW that enabled the union to
The “bracero program,” in reality a series of agreements between the U.S. and Mexico,
brought Mexican workers to the U.S. for temporary labor in the agricultural and railroad
industries during World War II. It began in 1945 and its agricultural agreements formally ended
in 1964, though some bracero contracts continued informally until 1967. The program was
criticized by social leaders for exploiting braceros, for attracting even more vulnerable
unauthorized migrants, and for degrading labor standards and wages for U.S. citizens. Ganz, Why
David Sometimes Wins, 50. See also Deborah Cohen, Braceros: Migrant Citizens and
Transnational Subjects in the Post-War United States and Mexico (Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 2011).
21

Dolores Huerta’s moral vision is not analyzed in this project because her leadership in the
UFW was more relevant to its strategic negotiations than to envisioning the institutional goals
and structures of the union, where Chávez exercised much more influence.
22

23

Ganz, Why David Sometimes Wins, 51–52, 251.
10
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succeed during the 1960s and 1970s, not comparatively favorable social environments,
compelling messaging, or charismatic leadership.24 Because “identity” is one of the personal
sources of strategic capacity named by Ganz, this analysis will now focus on Chávez’s personal
experiences, summarizing interactions with his social environment most relevant for
understanding and interpreting the intellectual content of his moral vision of social equality.25
César Chávez self-identified as a Mexican-American Catholic or a Chicano Catholic. The
primary source of his moral vision was his Chicano Catholic experience of farm worker suffering
and his commitment to free his oppressed and impoverished people from what he deemed unjust
suffering.26 His familial story was marked by the experience of profound inequalities and the
struggle for justice, which he interpreted through the lens of a religious faith that was mediated
by his family’s Mexican/Mexican-American popular Catholicism.27 Chávez’s commitment to the
cause of organizing farm workers was rooted not only in his long-term interests (because freeing

24

Ganz,10.

Ganz defines “identity” as the way that a person reflects on the past, attends to the present, and
anticipates the future, their “story.” Ganz, Why David Sometimes Wins, 14. Though I will discuss
all three institutional sources of strategic capacity (deliberative processes, resource flows, and
accountability), I will here primarily focus on one personal source--personal identity. The other
two personal sources of strategic capacity (a person’s relations or “social network” and tactical
repertoires) will only be referenced indirectly within my discussion of Chávez’s identity. Ganz,
10. My focus upon Chávez’s telling of his story (his autobiography) is meant to prepare the way
for my interpretation of his normative vision of equality. My intention is not to imply that his
relations (social network) and tactical repertoire are unrelated to his identity, or that they did not
significantly impact his strategic capacity (motivation, salient knowledge, and heuristic
practices). Rather, my goal here is to highlight the autobiographical context of his moral vision
of equality, rooting his moral vision in his self-understanding or “identity.”
25

Dalton, The Moral Vision of César Chávez, 6, 31-37, 79-80. For Chávez’s connection to the
Cursillo movement, see García, Católicos, 284.
26

For a thorough analysis of Chávez’s rootedness in Mexican-American popular Catholicism,
see Chapter 2, “Homespun Religion,” in Dalton, The Moral Vision of César Chávez.
27
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impoverished people is good for other impoverished people and for society as a whole), but also
in his theological and moral vision, in a sense of “calling.”28
Chávez was born in Arizona in 1927, nearly eighty years after “el norte” of Los Estados
Unidos Mexicanos became “the southwest” of the United States of America. As a person of
Mexican descent in this land, the young Chávez experienced the harshness of multilayered and
intertwined disparities in the U.S.A. Already the child of Mexican immigrants, at age ten Chávez
became the child of migratory farm workers and a farm worker himself. After young César’s
family farm was foreclosed on due to the unscrupulous actions of a bank president, the Chávez
family moved to California in 1938 to do migratory seasonal farm work.29 Historians Richard
Griswold del Castillo and Richard A. García describe Chávez’s life as a migrant farm worker as
one of “wretched migrant camps, corrupt labor contractors, meager wages for backbreaking
work, [and] bitter racism.”30 At ten years old, Chávez knew what it was like to work in row crops
with his parents and siblings, often missing school to do backbreaking work and sleeping outside
because his family’s earnings did not cover the cost of dilapidated and overcrowded farm worker
housing.31 Moral theologian Frederick John Dalton describes in this way Chávez’s childhood
experiences as a migrating farm worker amid racist segregation:
Chávez lived in shacks without electricity, heat, or plumbing; at times a garage or
a tent was home. The most miserable winter of his life was sleeping outside
“between the dirt and the sky” with his younger brother Richard in the cold
28

Dalton, The Moral Vision of César Chávez, 157, 162-163.

29

Dalton, 12.

30

Richard Griswold Del Castillo and Richard A. Garcia, César Chávez: A Triumph of Spirit
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1997), 11.
31

Dalton, The Moral Vision of César Chávez, 63.
12
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drizzle of the coastal Ventura County town of Oxnard while the rest of the family
squeezed into a tent surrounded by a sea of mud. It was a time when his older
sister Rita stopped going to school because she had no shoes. As migrant workers,
his family was deceived about wage rates, cheated out of wages earned, charged
exorbitant fees, and abused in numerous other ways by labor contractors and
growers up and down the state of California. Chávez felt the sting of the cold, the
blast of the heat, and the ache of stooping, twisting, kneeling, and crawling
through furrowed fields for endless hours. Yet, at the end of the day, the week, or
the year, despite arduous labor, the Chávez family remained poor. In a perverse
irony common to farm workers, they were too poor at times to afford to buy food.
César and his brother searched out mustard greens to eat while their father fished
with a pitchfork in an irrigation canal. Added to the physical hardship and
material poverty were the feelings arising from being denigrated and denied
because he was a Mexican, not worthy of equal respect and treatment, never mind
equal protection of the law.32
Chávez’s experiences as a migrant and seasonal farm worker spanned more than a
decade, including after serving honorably in the U.S. Navy during World War II, which he
pursued to escape the bodily and psychic violence of the fields but later described as the worst
years of his life.33 Upon returning from the Navy, married and with a growing family, Chávez
left a job in a lumberyard to begin work as an organizer with the Community Service

32

Dalton, 6-7.

Dalton, 6-7. For Chávez’s low regard for his years in the military, see Rick Tejada-Flores and
Ray Telles, The Fight in the Fields: César Chávez and the Farmworkers’ Struggle, documentary
film (Independent Television Service, 1997).
33
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Organization (CSO) in 1952. While he had participated in farm worker strikes with his parents, it
was not until he worked with the CSO that he began learning community organizing skills and
studying labor history. Chávez went on to become the CSO’s national director but left its relative
comforts in 1962 to form the Farm Worker Association (FWA) when the CSO refused to
organize farm workers into a labor union.34
From an early age, including while experiencing the relative freedom and security of
proximity to extended family and life on the family farm, Chávez faced bitter bigotry and racism,
such as this incident as a child in Arizona:
In class one of my biggest problems was the language. Of course, we bitterly
resented not being able to speak Spanish, but they insisted that we had to learn
English. They said that if we were American, then we should speak the language,
and if we wanted to speak Spanish, we should go back to Mexico. When we
spoke Spanish, the teacher swooped down on us. I remember the ruler whistling
through the air as its edge came down sharply across my knuckles. It really hurt.
Even out in the playground, speaking Spanish brought punishment.35
Thus, one of Chávez’s earliest and most vivid memories of inequality did violence to both his
body and his psyche and came at the intersection of multiple inequalities: culture, law, and social
representation (in the form of educational leadership and policymaking). Analyzing Chávez’s
comments, Dalton discusses the significance of language and culture in the construction of U.S.
social membership and domination. Together, he and Chávez observe the double paradox that a
Spanish-speaking citizen is incorporated yet unequal, foreign yet lacking autonomy:
34
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Born in the United States to Spanish-speaking parents, school taught César that he
was an outsider, a foreigner, less-than others, a Mexican. He learned that others
defined being American by what language one spoke. Speaking English made one
an American; speaking Spanish did not. César was living in two worlds—home
and school—and one of those worlds would not accept him as he was. “It’s a
terrible thing when you have your own language and customs, and those are
shattered. I remember trying to find out who I was and not being able to
understand. Once, for instance, I recall saying I was a Mexican. The teacher was
quick to correct me. ‘Oh, no, don’t say that!’ she said. But what else could I say?”
César remembered that the teacher told him he was an American, but that didn’t
make sense to him because his experience told him something else. “There were
too many reminders, too many times I would be called a Mexican in tones of
ridicule or contempt.”36
As a member of farm worker communities in California, Chávez also came to recognize that his
life was connected to the longsuffering of Mexican campesinos throughout history and to their
struggles for justice on both sides of the U.S.A.-México border.37 La causa, the struggle for farm
worker equality, resonated deeply with the story of Chávez’s Mexican people and with his own
theo-ethical vision, sustaining him amid the challenges of short-term sacrifices and threats to his
life. Further, according to Ganz, Chávez’s identity as a Chicano Catholic struggling for God’s

36

Dalton, The Moral Vision of César Chávez, 11. Cf. Jacques E. Levy and Barbara Moulton,
César Chávez: Autobiography of La Causa (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2007),
78.
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justice on earth contributed to the UFW’s strategic capacity, its organizational ability to generate
streams of effective strategy.
In his organizing, César Chávez placed great emphasis on the importance of social
equality, framing his discourse around “equality” and embodying concern for equality within the
UFW and as an urgent pursuit in society.38 Chávez promoted a faith-based culture of equality
within a “union community” by inviting voluntary actions, demanding the exercise of egalitarian
responsibilities, and institutionalizing certain egalitarian relationships. The co-founder and
president of the union, Chávez could be found in the union hall’s kitchen, preparing food or
washing dishes.39 He was known to forgo or to accept extremely low wages for his organizing
work, in order to keep the fledgling organization alive and as an indication of his solidarity with
impoverished farm workers.40 He similarly kept staff salaries far below going union rates and
relied heavily on volunteer organizers, in attempts to foster shared sacrifice and solidarity
between striking farm workers and union staff. He also allocated within the organization’s
structures some decision-making power for paid organizers, believing that they were entitled to
some control over their labor and the organization they worked for.41 This was a departure from

38
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the Saul Alinsky model of organizing, which generally regarded union staff as employees rather
than stakeholders entitled to participate in major institutional decision-making.42
The importance of group culture is highlighted in one of Chávez’s clearest definitions of
a union, which he gave in 1963 after the association established itself as a national organization
(the NFWA) and moved toward becoming a labor union. Emphasizing the importance of
institutional culture, he declared, “A union is not simply getting enough workers to stage a strike.
A union is building up a group with a spirit all its own . . . a union must be built around the idea
that people must do things by themselves, in order to help themselves.”43 More than the basic
institutional capacity to execute political tactics, Chávez sought to embody, spread and
institutionalize what some have called a culture of collective “self help,” meaning mutual aid at
the most local and non-governmental level. This culture, typified by the organization’s motto,
“Si se puede,” permeated a union that increasingly understood itself as a farm worker community
within a broad civil rights movement. This movement, inspired by its family-based “self help” or
mutual support culture, created structures for the provision of essential services (e.g., burial
insurance), cooperatives (e.g., a credit union and auto-repair shop), and educational initiatives.44
Yet these efforts were intended to advance the proximate goal of building the capacity to win a
recognized labor union, which could then negotiate collectively bargained labor contracts.45 This
culture, these mutual support initiatives, and the goal of union recognition and collective
bargaining were all for the purpose of promoting well-being and equal social participation.

42

Ganz, 89, 103. See also Dalton, The Moral Vision of César Chávez, 103.
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Chávez took seriously the importance of institutional mechanisms and took great care in
establishing the structures of the union that would largely determine the culture of the “union
community.” Although Chávez did not always live up to his egalitarian ideals, instead
increasingly responding to pressures on the UFW by making anti-democratic leadership
decisions within the union,46 his positive actions and egalitarian vision are nonetheless
significant and represent vitally important aspects of U.S. Catholic promotion of social equality
in the 20th century.
César Chávez and Social Equality
I now turn to Chávez’s leadership decisions and discourse in order to interpret his
particular understanding of equality. The purpose of this section is to elevate one liberating
element of Chávez’s thought and legacy, which contributed to the UFW’s past successes. At
times, Chávez abandoned his egalitarian commitments, instead making anti-democratic
leadership decisions within the UFW. Nevertheless, his efficacious vision and actions for
equality are one reason that people continue to study his legacy and are important aspects of U.S.
Catholic promotion of social equality in the 20th century. This analysis does not romanticize
Chávez’s legacy, but rather seeks to describe a positive thematic contribution to the discipline of
social ethics from this 20th century U.S. figure, before considering related insights that emerge
from Chávez’s leadership failures.
Though Chávez had a coherent religious-moral vision that shaped his social philosophy,
his moral vision and ideology were not as systematic as one expects from professional ethicists
or social theorists. “Chávez was never clear philosophically or ideologically about what he

46
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wanted,” Griswold del Castillo and García write.47 Chávez did not systematically theorize a
vision of social justice or his approach to social equality, yet these scholars note that his desires
and instincts were always centered on justice for impoverished persons. They describe Chávez’s
moral vision as a “Christian ethos” and a “culture of social justice.”48 This aligns with what
Mark Day, a Franciscan priest and Chávez supporter and friend, wrote in 1971 when he noted
Chávez’s “deep reverence for human life” and characterized him as “both a mystic visionary and
pragmatist, with a heavy accent on the latter.”49 Thus, we can consider Chávez a practitioner or
artist of an egalitarian vision of justice—an egalitarian pragmatist—rather than a systematic
theorist of equality. Nevertheless, Chávez’s actions and words offer implicit and explicit
responses to central theoretical questions concerning social equality, while also providing a basis
for critiquing Chávez’s anti-egalitarian leadership failings on his own terms.
Again, this examination of Chávez’s egalitarian vision will be framed by the following
questions: 1) Why is social inequality harmful and morally objectionable? (Why is equality
socially and morally significant?) 2) What particular types and levels of inequality are harmful
and morally objectionable? (Specifically, what equalities are morally desirable?) 3) Who ought to
be included or excluded from prescriptive efforts to ensure equality? Put differently, toward
47

Griswold Del Castillo and Garcia, César Chávez: A Triumph of Spirit, 110. See also Dalton,
The Moral Vision of César Chávez, 81.
Liberal academics have significantly downplayed the faith-based character of Chávez’s social
vision and activism, contributing to the dominant portrayal of him as a secular social activist.
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whom should wealth and power redistribution be directed and from whose resources should they
be taken? (Equality of whom?) 4) How ought equalization to be achieved?
Why is socio-economic inequality harmful and morally objectionable?
This first question entails descriptive elements concerning which social disparities
Chávez deemed worthy of attention and why he deemed these disparities significant. Chávez’s
descriptive and moral discourse concerning social inequalities, and injustice generally, can be
organized around three recurrent themes: material impoverishment, racism, and the
instrumentalization of human labor.50 The question also entails normative considerations,
concerning why Chávez saw these disparities as morally objectionable, that is, as “inequalities.”
Though it is not always easy to separate Chávez’s descriptive claims from his normative claims
concerning social disparities, this analysis will begin with the descriptive considerations,
followed by the normative aspects.
First, Chávez regularly spoke about “poverty,” usually focused on material
impoverishment and bodily wellbeing. El Plan de Delano, the UFW’s early farm worker
manifesto written by playwright Luis Valdez in consultation with Chávez, describes profound
bodily suffering endured by farm workers who experience “starvation wages, day hauls
[inconsistent employment] … forced migration, sickness, illiteracy, camps and sub-human living
conditions,” making “other men rich” through “stoop labor.”51 These wages and living

While Frederick Dalton does not categorize Chávez’s vision of justice in this way, I have
gleaned these categories from patterns I recognize within his analysis of Chávez’s moral vision.
Hints of these three categories can be seen in Dalton, The Moral Vision of César Chávez, 68, 7879. Dalton speaks of racism and economic exploitation specifically, though not in a sustained
discussion of Chávez’s vision of structural justice.
50
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conditions are endured by workers in order to survive and preserve the possibility of survival for
their families.
Throughout his life, Chávez exhibited concern for various types of material inequalities
relating to food, water, health, shelter, and financial means to secure these. He initiated efforts to
alleviate the gravest symptoms of material impoverishment among farm workers, yet designed
these efforts to enhance the collective organizational capacity of the union, to promote an
equality of power, so that workers could directly secure greater material sufficiency and wellbeing for themselves through compensation for their labor.
Second, Chávez spoke of “racism,” often emphasizing its cultural or ideological
dimensions that justify diverse manifestations of institutionalized white supremacy. El Plan de
Delano repeatedly refers to “racism” and defends “the Mexican race” and “minority races,”
indicating the centrality of resisting racist inequalities for the union’s mission. At times, Chávez
used the word “racism” to describe personal attitudes perhaps better described as xenophobic or
ethnocentric bigotry.52 However, he primarily discussed racism in a manner consistent with the
U.S. construction of racism, that is, according to the ideological construction of skin-color
meanings that justify the unequal distribution of social power.53 Chávez’s attention to race
named an important aspect of the complex reality of California agribusiness domination, where
mostly white men dominate dark-skinned workers, primarily Mexicans, Chicanxs, and Filipinxs.
His race consciousness also exposed the white supremacist underpinnings and implications of
seemingly race-blind arguments used against the UFW. In so doing, Chávez described a
significant aspect of the cultural contribution to U.S. social inequality, one that functions not

52
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only to justify the dominant social position of most whites but also to keep working class people
divided among ourselves. Chávez’s attentiveness to racist ideology and racist social stratification
revealed the situation of California farm workers while fostering links within the Civil Rights
Movement, both organizationally and in the public imagination.54
Third, Chávez denounced the treatment of workers as “instruments” or farm implements
by those with greater structural power, tools to be used and discarded at their “master’s” whim.55
He frequently cited Pope Leo XIII, who is the source of this theoretical category in Chávez’s
own thought.56 El Plan de Delano refers to the pope’s words directly, stating: “Everyone’s first
duty is to protect the workers from the greed of speculators who use human beings as
instruments to provide themselves with money. . .” Instrumentalization, in Chávez’s thought,
was opposed to human dignity and to human agency, the capacity to carry out one’s desires.57 In
its extreme, instrumentalization results in vile servitude and forced labor. Instrumentalization or
“objectification,” like impoverishment, entails structural causes that incapacitate persons or
categories of people from carrying out their aims within the polis. One can be instrumentalized,
reduced to the status of a controllable object rather than respected as a free person, when
relationships are unequally structured, thereby allowing for the suppression of the subordinate
person’s agency. Though a person/group with greater power may not in all circumstances choose
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or even be able to quash the agency of a subordinate person or group, institutionalizing certain
equalities helps ensure equal treatment between persons or groups.
I now turn to the normative aspects of Chávez’s vision. Although Chávez did not
articulate a systematic understanding of the overlapping and interconnected inequalities of
material impoverishment, racism, and daily instrumentalization, he referred to them collectively
as “injustice” and sought to alleviate these dehumanizing indignities through the organization
and strategic deployment of material, structural, and symbolic power.58 In abstract terms,
equality matters for Chávez because social inequalities harm people in ways that fail to recognize
and respect persons or groups of people as inherently equal in ultimate worth.59 Chávez was
particularly concerned about dehumanizing farm wages, subhuman working conditions, and
inhumanely long working hours, which degrade humanity and result from a complex mingling of
material, structural, and cultural-symbolic inequalities.
Chávez’s vision of equality, like his larger moral vision, was centered on a commitment
to the equal dignity or value of each person. In this vision, each person represents the
fundamental good. Chávez’s commitment to equally dignified human lives was grounded in his
theological vision of each person as created and equally loved by God.60 Therefore, bearing
God’s image, through God’s creative and loving action, each person is equally dignified. The
UFW’s struggle for dignified human life and social justice, with social equality as a constitutive
element, was the struggle for life consistent with the fundamental equal dignity of every farm
worker with other human persons.
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Chávez’s theological anthropology arose from his experience of people, interpreted
through the popular wisdom and practices of Mexican/Chicanx Catholicism and later through
Catholic social teaching, especially papal teachings.61 In the midst of immense human suffering
caused by oppression, Chávez experienced and maintained faith in the equal value of all people.
What official Catholic social teaching describes in the general and abstract terms of a
“commitment to human dignity,” Chávez experienced daily with actual suffering, dark-skinned,
Spanish- and Tagalog-speaking workers, with light-skinned, English-speaking people who were
business owners or UFW allies, and with many other people. In dedicating himself to farm
workers in their struggle for liberation and political-economic equality, Chávez embodied a
faith-based conviction in their fundamentally equal value.
Defending human dignity, Chávez seemed to place his greatest tactical focus on
combatting instrumentalization, the stifling of capacity to act purposefully. In opposition to it, he
declared “Sí se puede” and organized available community power to soften the blows of material
and cultural-symbolic inequality while using newly organized resources to leverage institutional
changes at various levels of U.S. governance, thereby making new forms of structural power
available to be organized and deployed. Chávez did not view the relationship of these forms of
power in a unidirectional way but sought to help people see the importance of combining and
deploying their available material, symbolic, and structural resources to secure more equal shares
of these forms of power.62
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For Chávez, social inequality entailed diverse bodily, psychic, material, and structural
disparities, all of which constitute denials of equal human dignity.63 The negative effects of these
disparities ripple through the families and communities to which subordinated workers belong,
causing further harm. Thus, for Chávez, a life consistent with a person’s inherent dignity is a life
in community marked by respect and equality.64 There are no dignified lives apart from life in a
just society. From this perspective, structural justice is essential to the protection and promotion
of dignified human life and equality is inherent in the meaning of structural justice. Structural
inequalities violate human dignity by subordinating or excluding some members of the
community, thereby harming the community that enables all members to realize their full
humanity.
What particular types and levels of inequality are harmful and morally objectionable?
Chávez described the criterion of equality in a variety of overlapping and conflicting
ways. These criteria typically addressed both human bodily needs and structural/institutional
equality, typified by Chávez’s common use of the metaphor “bread and justice,” borrowed from
the rhetoric of the Mexican Revolution to describe what the farm workers were seeking via their
social movement.65 As I noted earlier, Chávez often spoke of the desire for workers to have equal
possession of or access to basic goods necessary for sustaining the human body and mind. At
other times, he spoke of the desire for liberation and freedom, such as control over one’s labor or
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over determining its market value.66 Perhaps most fundamentally, he objected to unequal civil
rights, such as rights concerning worker association and to union representation.67
Chávez and the UFW regularly expressed the goal of achieving equality with other U.S.
workers.68 They commonly focused on the denial of legal equality, citing farm workers’
exclusion from the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, which had provided protections and
fair procedures for U.S. workers who desired to form labor unions. Chávez wanted legislative
reform because he recognized union recognition and collective bargaining rights as the keys to
transforming the structural relationship between land/business owners, labor contractors, and
laborers. Altering this relationship would enable more adequate and equal compensation,
working conditions, and workplace participation. This was a quite modest egalitarian goal, as
even the formal right to a union election was no guarantee of a fair election or of protection from
anti-union tactics, let alone more dignified terms of employment. Nevertheless, Chávez saw
equal labor rights (and their enforcement), comparable to those of other workers, as the
necessary preconditions for widespread success in unionization, which would enable the
achievement of other egalitarian outcomes.69
The fact that Chávez and the UFW emphasized legal equality with other U.S. workers
does not imply that such narrowly defined equality was Chávez’s ultimate goal or the full extent
of his moral vision of social equality. Nor does it imply that Chávez looked upon the U.S. state
as the fundamental authority for defining the moral standards of social justice. Rather, Chávez’s
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his modest goal of formal legal equality between workers was a publicly palatable and feasible
proximate goal—though one unpopular to this day—that would make further advances possible.
Chávez and the UFW’s discourse advanced this proximate goal by revealing the hypocrisy of
farm worker exclusion from what the U.S. government deemed socially just for most other U.S.
laborers.
Related to Chávez’s concern for “liberation” and labor “freedom,” his cultural-symbolic
affirmations, with particular attention to language, indicate that his vision of equality exceeded
formal equality in the realm of U.S. labor law. Chávez recognized assimilationist practices and
policies as assaults on cultural equality that also had detrimental material and structural
implications.70 Thus, he emphasized the importance of a group’s cultural authority over its social
space. Chávez conducted union business primarily in Spanish; El Malcriado, the union
newspaper, was first published in Spanish, and the union’s meetings and popular education were
carried out primarily in Spanish.71 Even when the union bore witness to the struggle within the
larger U.S. society, such as during pilgrimage marches, symbols like Our Lady of Guadalupe and
the Mexican flag were displayed prominently alongside the U.S. flag.72 Such expressions often
came from the initiative of workers themselves, not union staff.73 Deploying these symbols and
practices was not merely a useful organizing tactic, though it did increase effectiveness with
70
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Mexican and Chicanx workers. It was also a way of educating the larger society about the
identity of the movement while embodying affirmations of the equal dignity of Mexicandescended people.
One might interpret the absence of a clearly stated criterion or “utopian vision” of
equality, in the UFW’s struggle, as a lack of moral or political direction. UFW leaders may have
had no clearly imagined “final destination” in their march toward equality. However, this should
also be recognized as evidence of a highly pragmatic and flexible movement operating in an
unstable social environment. Union leaders sought greater equality of access to basic material
goods and more equal freedoms, and greater equality under the law as a mode of achieving these
ends.
Who ought to be included in or excluded from prescriptive efforts to ensure equality?
Chávez’s advocacy focused primarily on non-migrant seasonal farm workers. These
fairly settled workers were primarily U.S. citizens and authorized residents, though unauthorized
residents were also welcome within the UFW. While farm workers who were citizens and
authorized residents were most certainly among the most impoverished workers in U.S. society,
their political status afforded them certain securities not available to transitory workers, who also
tended to lack authorized residency status. Though the UFW under Chávez commonly failed to
account for political-economic solutions necessary for migratory and/or unauthorized workers,
Chávez’s strategizing often took them into account, as union members, impoverished “brothers
and sisters,” and potential adversaries.74 Thus, I argue that Chávez’s advocacy represented a type
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of trans-state egalitarianism, whereby the long-term interests and well-being of impoverished
citizens and non-citizens alike were given priority.75
Chávez believed, based on available evidence, that increasing the number of unionized
farm workers would exert positive effects on farm workers throughout the labor market,
regardless of their union status.76 While he encouraged UFW members to serve persons even
poorer than themselves, his mindfulness of the overall labor situation of farm workers indicates
that his concern for migrant workers went beyond mere almsgiving. UFW members would “lift
as they climbed” by directly assisting those with greater needs than their own and by striving for
union contracts that created beneficial ripple effects throughout the farm labor market, for
citizens and non-citizens alike.77 An increase in unionized workers within a sector of the labor
market increases wages and improves working conditions throughout that sector, as employers
compete for workers while making concessions to dissuade unionization. This is especially true
in farm work, where the immobility of land dissuades job “outsourcing” when worker
unionization appears imminent. Additionally, increasing the power of some farm workers
relative to their employers through unionization not only decreases the power of the agribusiness
owners relative to other farm workers, it also increases the relative power of non-farm workers
throughout the agribusiness owner’s supply chain. Though Chávez focused his energies on the
more settled citizen and authorized resident “locals,” who were easier to organize and mobilize

Admittedly, this argument is complicated by the UFW’s opposition to the exploitative bracero
program, under Chávez’s leadership. See Ganz, Why David Sometimes Wins, 83-84.
75

76

Ganz, 240.

77

Dalton, The Moral Vision of César Chávez, 76-77.
29

Published by USF Scholarship: a digital repository @ Gleeson Library | Geschke Center, 2019

29

Journal of Hispanic / Latino Theology, Vol. 21, No. 1 [2019], Art. 3

than migratory workers, he nevertheless envisioned the UFW as a national organization and
considered the impact of the UFW’s actions on the broader labor market.78
Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that some workers, especially migratory (often
unauthorized) workers, were harmed in the short term by particular decisions made by the UFW,
as it sought to build a union with more stable local residents and to improve conditions
throughout the farm labor market.79 While migratory workers were helped in the long term
because the labor market was becoming more worker-friendly, particular lives were also
significantly disrupted by UFW control of particular locales. For instance, UFW regulation of
labor in a particular locale meant that work was allocated according to seniority of union
membership.80 Building seniority required forgoing a migratory livelihood, which might result in
a lower annual income than year-round migratory work. It also often meant that family members
could not labor together, as they might not all have the same seniority status or be needed to
work on a given day. Thus, while UFW advances brought short- and longer-term benefits
directly to UFW members and indirectly to other farm workers, some farm workers were
negatively impacted in the short term.
In addition to considering the impact of non-migrant farm worker organizing on migrant
(often undocumented) farm workers and labor contractors, analyzing Chávez’s relationship with
Chávez’s legacy of responding to the needs of unauthorized resident farmworkers is mixed and
warrants a sustained treatment that is not possible in this article. Given contemporary uses of
anti-immigrant rhetoric deployed by Chávez, it is worth noting that the UFW has long advocated
immigration reforms that would reduce the vulnerability of unauthorized resident farmworkers
and thereby strengthen the bargaining power of all farmworkers. One noteworthy attempt by a
religion scholar to engage this topic is Luis León, “Misusing César Chávez in Immigration
Debate,” Religion Dispatches, December 5, 2010, http://religiondispatches.org/misusing-CésarChávez-in-immigration-debate/.
78

79

Dalton, The Moral Vision of César Chávez, 74.

80

Dalton, 74-75.
30

https://repository.usfca.edu/jhlt/vol21/iss1/3

30

Cruz: César Chávez and Egalitarian Ethics

prominent Mexican-American political organizations offers further insight into the scope of
Chávez’s concern for equality. For example, amid a UFW strike and a tightened agricultural
labor market, the Mexican-American Political Association (MAPA) and other organizations,
along with the U.S. Department of Labor, helped agribusiness employers locate and recruit
replacement workers.81 Chávez protested MAPA’s actions, arguing that this assistance to
agribusiness owners and their political allies made it more difficult to leverage business owners
into recognizing the union. Chávez was interested in mobilizing workers to make effective
claims on their recruiters, not in strengthening the hand of business owners by helping them find
low-wage workers, even if these newly employed people were of Mexican descent. Chávez’s
goal was not merely to make a larger proportion of jobs go to persons of Mexican descent, but
rather to make all jobs have better wages and working conditions and to make them available to
people in an equitable manner. This incident with MAPA represents an interesting contrast
between ethnicity/race-based class conflict and ethnicity/race-based assistance to capitalists.
Chávez wanted to change the agribusiness system, not simply to secure a better position within
the unjust system for his ethno-cultural community.82 His efforts sought to eradicate structures
that impoverish persons and to do so in ways that responded to the needs of ethno-cultural and
citizen-based communities while also transcending their boundaries in pursuit of freedom and
justice for all.
Chávez was clearly concerned with the well-being of Mexican and Chicanx workers.
However, he was not willing to advance their short-term interests by sacrificing their long-term
interests and those of workers from other communities. This was not a privileging of color-blind
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anti-classism over racial concerns, so much as a privileging of long-term (and race-conscious)
anti-classism over short-term ethno-racial group interests that undermined the common good.
Chávez and the union were not interested in helping serve more crumbs from the proverbial
“American pie” to people of Mexican descent. Instead, they rejected the contents of that
economic pie, opposed the exclusion of Mexican-Americans/Chicanxs from the decision-making
process that determined the pie’s contents, and questioned the unequal size of the pie’s pieces. At
the height of NFWA/UFW activity, the protest of MAPA shows that Chávez had little interest in
helping Mexicans and Chicanxs secure more equitable employment relative to other ethnic
communities if that “equality” also resulted in worsened poverty overall or if it intensified
inequalities between workers and owners as a result.83 Here we see, despite union rhetoric, that
Chávez’s vision of equality was more expansive than mere equality with other U.S. workers. His
desired social equality at the expense of agribusiness owners’ dominance and privileges, not by
undermining the wellbeing and power of other impoverished workers.
How ought equalization to be achieved?
Specifically, the UFW sought to promote greater social equalities by undermining the
farm labor contracting system, which Chávez viewed as the linchpin of the oppressive
agribusiness system.84 This required workers to collectively bargain the terms of their
employment rather than contracting individually with contractors. When the labor-contracting
portion of the agribusiness system was undermined, control over the contracting of workers
would pass from labor contractors (agents of the employer) to union leadership (agents of the
workers). Because labor contractors were given incentives to deliver the lowest possible wages,
83
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they often pitted workers against one another through all manner of manipulation and
favoritism.85 This system effectively lowered wages and minimized worker grievances. When
workers collectively bargained to create union hiring halls operated through their union
infrastructure, jobs were allocated according to agreed-upon processes such as union seniority.86
Under these more predictable employment conditions, workers could better guard against the
labor contractor manipulation that commonly undermined worker solidarity, compensation, and
safety. Union hiring halls disrupted employer hiring and management privileges and inhibited
employers’ ability to violate criminal and labor laws with impunity.87
In an indirect way, the redistribution of social power from employers to local resident
farm workers undermined the small privileges and livelihood of labor contractors who mediated
the business owner-worker relationship. Calling contractors “middlemen” can be deceptive,
because they are not really “in the middle”: their compensation is much closer to that of farm
workers, while their loyalties reside with agribusiness owners. Labor contractors commonly
receive higher pay (relative to farm workers) and other workplace privileges in exchange for
suppressing worker organizing and demands.88 Contractors’ improved compensation relative to
farm workers is a direct function of their willingness to assist the agribusiness owner in
suppressing the greater “threat” of worker demands and unionization. Although labor contractors
are often not paid much better than farm workers, and are often former farm workers themselves,
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they are agents of agribusiness owners and an integral part of the oppressive agribusiness
system.89 The prescriptive aim of the UFW was to make contractors’ jobs obsolete.
More generally, Chávez sought to achieve material, cultural-symbolic, and structural
equality by means of organizing and strategically employing available power. Social resources or
power were the primary means of advancing his larger vision of “the good life,” which was
persons living in loving (nonviolent) service consistent with their equally dignified humanity.90
Power is the means by which equality is achieved. Specifically, Chávez and the UFW sought to
redistribute power within the agribusiness system by using collective bargaining to replace the
labor contract system with union-controlled hiring halls.91 Engaging in collective bargaining
required first securing union recognition, which was primarily attained through the enactment of
nonviolent power via strikes and boycotts, because farm workers were excluded from federal
legislation designed to ensure fair union election processes.92
For Chávez, “being political” was not simply about voting or asking politicians for
legislative changes, as important as these actions were. Rather, “being political” was about
organizing and deploying any structural, material, or cultural-symbolic power available in order
to achieve just outcomes. Power was not an evil for Chávez, though he lamented having to use it
to secure justice.93 Rather, it was the necessary means to achieve either evil ends or the material
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necessities of well-being, equitable cultural space, and greater structural equalities. He
recognized the dangers of unequally distributed power, but did not view power as itself an evil.
The redistribution of structural power brought by the UFW’s union recognition and
collectively bargained labor contracts was the central catalyst for producing greater social
equalities for California farm workers. Union recognition and labor contracts enabled workers to
enjoy greater compensation, protections, and participation in labor-related decision-making.94
The structural, material, and cultural-symbolic gains achieved through unionization and
collective bargaining represented new forms of power available to be mobilized for the sake of
further promoting equality with land/business owners and within the myriad governmental
bodies that established labor and employer rights and agricultural policies. Through the greater
power (structural, material, symbolic) obtained by means of bargained contracts, farm workers
were able to continue their concerted efforts to meet basic daily needs. Gains from these
contracts also enabled them to advance their struggle for even more favorable contracts, for more
labor rights, for less harmful agricultural policies, while also challenging the legitimacy of
certain employer rights.95
Organizing power, like all political activity, is a teleological venture. What farm workers
needed was a union, collective bargaining, and hiring halls, which would enable them to attain
the compensation, work hours, working conditions, and decision-making participation they
sought. In order to gain union recognition (structural power), farm workers first needed to use
what resources they already had to maximize the size, resources, and solidarity within their
organization. They achieved this by providing basic services, organizing consumer and financial
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cooperatives, developing educational initiatives, registering voters, and securing outside
funding.96 In this way, they recognized material and already-present structural power as potential
sources of additional power. Similarly, Chávez employed a wide range of nonviolent ethnoreligious symbols and practices to advance his short- and long-term goals. He prayed regularly,
participated in Catholic masses, engaged in grueling fasts, and led pilgrimage marches to achieve
the union community’s proximate goals, which advanced its larger egalitarian goals.97 He and
other organizers and farm workers frequently drew upon their faith-based cultural resources to
sustain the union community and to bear witness to their struggle for dignified life.98
Equality and the United Farmworkers of America
The UFW and its predecessor organizations (the FWA, NFWA, and UFWOC) made
greater egalitarian advances in the lives of farm workers than any labor organization in
California history, although the organization’s transformative power declined from the early
1980s onward.99 In 1966, following a grueling seven-month strike and organizing campaign
against Schenley Industries, a major liquor distributor and grape production owner, the National
Farm Workers Association (NFWA) gained formal legal recognition by successfully negotiating
a legitimate union contract (without need of a formal election process), the first in California
farm labor history.100 Later that year, the NFWA won the first union representation election in
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California agricultural history, overcoming violent collusion between the DiGiorgio Fruit
Corporation and the Teamsters Union.101 In 1966, the NFWA also absorbed the AFL-CIO’s
Agricultural Worker’s Organizing Committee (AWOC), forming the United Farm Workers
Organizing Committee (UFWOC), and organization that would bring the entire California table
grape industry under union contract by 1970.102
Ganz summarizes the later accomplishments of the United Farm Workers of America, the
union’s official name since its AFL-CIO membership began in 1972:
By 1977 the United Farm Workers . . . had successfully negotiated more than 100
union contracts, recruited a dues-paying membership of 50,000, and secured
enactment of the California Labor Relations Act, the only legislative guarantee of
farm workers’ collective bargaining rights in the continental United States. The
UFW also played a major role in the emergence of a Chicano movement in the
southwestern United States, recruited and trained hundreds of community
activists, and became a significant player in California politics.103
When the UFW and its predecessor organizations won contracts, farm workers received
improved wages, benefits, and work conditions (such as cool water and toilets in the fields).104 It
also created union hiring halls, which fundamentally altered the structure of agribusiness by
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replacing the exploitative practice of labor contracting with union-controlled allocation of field
workers to job sites.105 Ganz further comments:
From the late 1960s to the early 1980s, the UFW had a major impact on the lives
of farm workers—and the Latino community in general. Farm worker wages,
benefits, and working conditions steadily improved as the UFW won contracts
and as non-union employers made improvements to preempt the union. Public
advocacy by the UFW spurred the enactment of rural education, health training,
and legal assistance programs. The UFW’s readiness to demand accountability
from public officials won the enforcement of local, state, and federal statutory
protections and elected more responsive officials. Opportunities for farm workers’
access to job, educational, and political mobility improved and at the same time
facilitated a growing Latino political influence. And the UFW contributed knowhow, inspiration, and alumni to the broader progressive movement, including
union, civic, and political leaders who learned their craft in the UFW and whose
networks encourage organizing in California and elsewhere to the present day.106
For nearly two decades, the UFW thus not only shook the agribusiness system, it fed into the
Chicano movement, a cultural renaissance and political movement that became a major force
within and beyond California electoral politics.107
How did the UFW achieve these advances for political-economic equality? Scholars and
popular writers have offered an array of conflicting explanations for the UFW’s successes,
105

Ganz, Why David Sometimes Wins, 194.

106

Ganz, 241.

107

García, Católicos, 132.

38
https://repository.usfca.edu/jhlt/vol21/iss1/3

38

Cruz: César Chávez and Egalitarian Ethics

proposing that the success was due to a unique political environment, or the UFW’s compelling
public narrative, or Chávez’s charismatic leadership.108 Many accounts, however, ignore
significant socio-historical data concerning the institutional agency of actors like the UFW.
Some scholars also fail to account for the ways in which the UFW helped create its favorable
political environment or ignore the failures of other groups who operated under similar or more
favorable environmental opportunities.109 Often ignored are the UFW’s formulation of effective
strategies and, more importantly, the personal and organizational origins of these strategies.110
In Why David Sometimes Wins: Leadership, Organization, and Strategy in the California
Farm Worker Movement, Marshall Ganz offers a compelling theory to explain how these
advances were achieved amid diverse environmental opportunities and obstacles. His theory for
“Why David sometimes wins” is heavily informed by both his research in social psychology and
his earlier insider experiences as a former labor organizer and board member for the UFW—a
unique combination of knowledge among authors who have interpreted the significance of the
UFW. Ganz compellingly argues that the UFW’s successes resulted from its capacity to produce
superior streams of strategy, which he terms “strategic capacity.”111 Strategic capacity consists of
an organization’s collective level of motivation, its salient knowledge, and the quality of its
heuristic practices.112 Ganz argues that an organization’s strategic capacity has three personal
sources (rooted in institutional leaders specifically): personal identity, social networks, and
108
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tactical repertoires.113 Further, an organization’s strategic capacity is derived from three
institutional sources: its deliberative processes, its resource flows, and its accountability
structures.114
Ganz’s theory, in particular its elaboration of institutional sources of strategic capacity, is
drawn from his conclusion that the UFW was effective from the 1960s through the late 1970s
because its leadership team regularly engaged in open and dynamic strategy deliberations, which
channeled energy, knowledge, and practices of investigation (heuristics) that emerged from the
identities, social networks, and tactical repertoires of the organization’s leadership team,
members, and partners.115 Early on, the UFW’s engagement in deliberative processes that were
regular, open, and authoritative synergized the motivations, knowledge, and investigation
practices of team members, thereby developing collective energy and competencies greater than
the sum of their parts and contributing to strategic successes.116 Through these deliberative
processes, group members’ motivation, salient knowledge, and practices of discovery could be
enhanced, thus enabling effective strategizing.117
Within the UFW, Ganz argues, egalitarian goals were also pursued because workers
provided and controlled the flow of resources that sustained the organization.118 Typically, an
organization pursues the goals of its true constituency, those who fill its purse. From this view,
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the UFW was capable of advancing farm workers’ egalitarian aims because its resources flowed
primarily from farm workers to the organization’s leadership.119 For example, in the early UFW,
financial resources flowed primarily from farm workers (in the form of membership dues) to the
organizational leadership, which rendered UFW officials highly dependent upon and responsive
to the desires of the workers.120 Resource flows determine the degree and quality of
interdependence between an organization’s constituents and its officials, and between the
officials and allied groups, thereby impacting motivational “buy-in” and widening the breadth of
salient knowledge and investigative practices absorbed by organizational officials.121
Further, Ganz argues, it is important that resources flowed into and out of the UFW in a
wide network. While it was important that UFW officials were dependent upon farm workers,
maintaining a broad resource base also provided a stability that is necessary for social
movements, especially movements of people already targeted with systemic violence and the
repression of dissent. Early on, Chávez rejected many forms of “outside” money for fear of
undermining the agency of farm workers or undercutting the union’s dependence upon them.122
However, over time, he recognized the value of expanding the union’s base of support, which
enabled it to channel new material resources and services toward the achievement of worker
goals, thereby expanding the union’s sphere of social influence.123 Under Chávez’s leadership,
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the UFW increasingly (yet selectively) accepted government and private grants and other
donations, which also enhanced the flow of relevant knowledge, usually to the benefit of farm
workers.124
Finally, Ganz argues that the UFW’s early structures of accountability held union
officials in relationships of reciprocity with one another and with farm workers, thereby
enhancing the union’s motivation, salient knowledge, and investigative practice.125 Early on,
farm workers, not outside labor organizations (like the AFL-CIO) or other socially dominant
groups, legitimized the authority of UFW officials.126 For example, UFW officials were elected
by UFW members (or chosen by other elected UFW officials), which meant that the union’s
leaders received their legitimacy from “from below” and remained accountable to farm workers,
unlike other organizations that had failed to effectively organize farm workers.127
César Chávez and the Decline of the UFW
Unfortunately, over time, Chávez centralized control over the union’s structures of
legitimacy and accountability, eroding officials’ accountability to farm workers, and also
increasingly depended on external funding when membership dues declined.128 Absent a high
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degree of accountability to workers or material dependence on new member dues, the UFW
ceased to be a major force for the unionization of farm workers.129 The organization continued to
exist (and even grew), but it was now increasingly dependent upon the cultural capital of Chávez
(as a heroic symbol), which enabled it to raise funds and capitalize the assets necessary to feed
the organization, even as its mission and priorities changed dramatically.130
The UFW’s significant victories for farm workers were short-lived. Though weakened by
intensifying assaults from political opponents and from unfavorable social conditions, César
Chávez, along with UFW leaders who enabled him, also diminished the union’s structure and
priorities.131 Chávez recognized the need to institutionalize the recent gains of the farm worker
movement if these were to endure in a stable and long-lasting manner.132 However, he sought to
carry out this task on his own terms, having grown suspicious of union leaders and allies who
helped bring the UFW into existence in the first place.133 Recently published histories of the
UFW agree that Chávez exerted increasing control over the union’s decision-making
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mechanisms and thereby undermined the more open and democratic ethos of its earlier years.134
Between 1976 and 1981, Ganz argues, Chávez centralized the union’s decision-making power,
reduced transparency, quashed dissent, and alienated allies.135 Many lawyers, legal workers,
board members, organizers, negotiators, and other administrative staff were fired or dismissed, or
resigned.136 A district court ruling in 1981, the year Ganz resigned from the union’s national
Executive Board, even found that Chávez had acted illegally when he fired dissenting farm
worker leaders who sought representation on the union’s national board.137 In a summative
statement that Ganz would undoubtedly still affirm, he argued ten years ago, “Within just four
years, the UFW stopped organizing, drove out most of its experienced leaders, and entered into a
decline from which it has not recovered.”138
How substantial was this decline? Compared to the late 1970s, when it had 60,00070,000 members139 and 200 contracts, the UFW represented no more than 5,000 farm workers
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and held roughly 33 union labor contracts, as of Ganz’s publication in 2009.140 From the late
1970s onward, a new version of the UFW was ill equipped to challenge increasingly powerful
and effective political opposition at local, state, and federal levels. The union became largely
uninterested in worker organizing and other forms of grassroots political resistance that had
made it a dynamic social force in California for a decade and a half. In 2011, Ganz remarked that
the UFW no longer operates primarily as a labor union, but rather as a network of non-profit
organizations with assets of $42 million and pension and medical plans worth over $100 million
but which cover fewer than 3,000 workers.141 The UFW has been able to survive not so much
because of its resourcefulness, but rather because of “the depth of the political, economic, and
cultural resources it had acquired during its heyday.”142
Following Chávez’s death in 1993, the union attempted, mostly unsuccessfully, to resume
some efforts at farm worker organizing under the leadership of Arturo Rodriguez, Chávez’s sonin-law.143 By then, the union lacked the strategic capacity that previously enabled successful
strategizing and, in this regard, it remains a weaker union than it was in the late 1970s.144 In
2000, the UFW began broadening its focus to the larger Latinx community and changed its
constitutional mission to read “protecting and insuring” the rights of farm workers instead of
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“organizing” them.145 Thus, today the UFW, while still a labor union, operates more like a nonprofit organization, focusing on service provision, policy research, and legislative advocacy. 146
Linking the union’s decline to worsening of California farm worker circumstances
overall, Ganz characterized the situation in 2009 as follows:
In real dollars, the nearly 40,000 farm workers employed today by California’s
$30 billion agricultural industry earn wages 20-25 percent below those paid in the
late 1970s. In 2006, the most recent year for which such figures are available as of
this writing, the average California farm wage of $9 per hour was less than half of
the average wage in construction. Annual farm worker earnings of $7,000-$8,000
were a quarter of factory worker earnings of $30,000-$35,000. The abusive
contracting system that was in decline throughout the 1970s has made a major
comeback and accounts for some 43 percent of farm jobs today. Most farm
workers are still new immigrants, many of whom arrived long after the UFW
stopped organizing and at least 60 percent of whom lack a legal status that could
offer even minimal protection. Access to affordable housing, health care, and
education remains far behind that of other workers, and with a public no longer
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effectively challenged to pay attention, the harsh reality of their daily lives is
rarely noted.147
According to the more recent reporting, “The vast majority of the state’s seasonal farm
labor force, estimated at 350,000-450,000, do not belong to a union.”148
The UFW’s diminished capacity and its decrease in worker organizing campaigns have
resulted in a union that lacks the power base and strategic commitments necessary to grow and to
ensure that the California Agricultural Labor Relations Act (CALRA) is fully enforced.149 The
law only functioned as farm workers had hoped during its first four or five months, according to
Arturo Rodriguez, UFW President from 1993-2018.150 After that, farm owners quickly found
ways to circumvent the law and undermine its enforcement mechanisms. While this law remains
the only state collective bargaining statute in the United States “to establish a comprehensive
system for protecting the right of farmworkers to form unions and engage in collective
bargaining,”151 it only functions as a vestige of its original intent.
Learning from Critics: From Heroic Virtue to Instructive Communal Failure
Formulating his theory of effective grassroots organizing based upon an accurate insider
interpretation of the rise of the UFW--a rare moment where “David wins” against a historical
Goliath—and upon an accurate analysis of the union’s decline, Ganz has provided rich insights
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for anyone interested in advancing social goals with oppressed and exploited peoples. He also
provides valuable insights for egalitarian ethicists and other theorists of equality. His theorizing
of the three institutional sources of strategic capacity indicates that some measure of equality
among an organization’s officials and between its officials and constituents enables its effective
operation. Here, inclusive equality emerges not only an important goal but also a means toward
the effective realization of organizational goals. Ganz’s theorizing of institutional sources of
strategic capacity is drawn from his conclusion that the UFW was effective in part, from the
1960s through the late 1970s, because its diverse leadership team regularly engaged in open and
dynamic strategy deliberations, which channeled the motivation, knowledge, and investigation
practices drawn from the identities, social networks, and tactical repertoires of the union’s staff,
members, and partners.152 Conversely, the union later declined as a major force for farm worker
advancement because Chávez and his supporters were suspicious of and punitive toward
colleagues who disagreed while reducing and controlling deliberative processes, thus creating a
more stratified but less effective union.153
In addition to providing a theory for effective community organizing and mobilization,
Ganz has provided a model for transcending the temptation to uncritically elevate Chávez (or
other religious and social leaders) as paradigms of heroic virtue. Instead, Ganz enables his reader
to see that clear lessons can be drawn from honest engagement with both the historical
achievements and the historical failings of others. His account of the union’s survival well
beyond its peak as a force of social transformation is a cautionary reminder of the hazards
inherent in investing social leaders with outsized and static appraisals of moral virtue, especially

152

Ganz, Why David Sometimes Wins, 17-18, 90-91.

153

Ganz, 241.
48

https://repository.usfca.edu/jhlt/vol21/iss1/3

48

Cruz: César Chávez and Egalitarian Ethics

when personal character is assessed in isolation from its communal and societal effects. For
years, Chávez’s leadership was honored and fortified on the basis of actions and achievements
that were well behind him and that did not correspond to his present actions and the effects that
they were having on colleagues, union members, and not-yet-unionized farm workers. This
lesson should resonate with anyone who has been shocked by the harm caused by celebrated
“moral leaders” or awakened to their own complicity and enabling behaviors that can serve to
legitimize harmful leadership.
Chávez was able to drastically reverse the UFW’s course because many union leaders
initially deferred to his judgments and because union officials became increasingly less
financially dependent upon organizing workers and securing new member dues, having already
secured substantial resources through existing union contracts, government grants, external
fundraising, and other forms of social capital. According to Ganz, successful fundraising, the
capitalization of existing resources and greater stability brought by the CALRA, enabled UFW
revenues to soar even while Chávez decimated the UFW’s strategic capacity and UFW
membership declined.154 Chávez’s institutional decisions, in the context of external political
attacks on farm workers, produced UFW leadership that was increasingly distant from farm
workers’ priorities and dependent on promoting “the Chávez story” in order to procure outside
financial support. Whereas the union had previously been able to respond effectively to external
challenges, Ganz argues that it later declined because of its failure to address internal challenges
effectively.155 Chávez provides us with egalitarian ideas and examples of effective egalitarian
action; he also provides us with an important lesson in the dangers of unaccountable leadership.
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While acknowledging the countless social factors that have harmed farm workers and
unions in recent decades, Ganz maintains that leadership decisions concerning the UFW’s
institutional structures negatively shaped the impact that a hostile political environment exerted
on the UFW and farm workers generally.156 He contends that leaders and institutions are capable
of diminishing the impact of negative environmental factors and can even create new
opportunities in the midst of such opposition.157 Ganz insists that the UFW not only failed to
respond effectively to new political challenges, but that it made detrimental decisions before the
most deleterious political opposition began to mobilize in California and nationally.158 Refusing
to “blame the victim” or to ignore the harms caused by external actors, Ganz’s analysis affirms
that persons and groups have the capacity to respond to violence, pain, and continued threats in
ways that bring survival, freedom, and life. This affirmation of human agency, acknowledging
that we are not merely victims of history and that our destinies are not fully determined by our
social systems and environmental circumstances, is the necessary precondition for any ethical
evaluation and for collective ethical action.
Conclusion
At his best, César Chávez provides Christian ethics with an historical exemplar of
sacrificial and transformative faith-based egalitarianism, both in thought and in action. His is an
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egalitarian vision that encompasses concern for basic human needs (over against
impoverishment), deploys cultural and religious resources to affirm and narrate human equality
(over against racist ideology), and attends to the social structures that foster human freedom
(over against the instrumentalization of human labor).
However (as is often the case with ourselves), we learn as much or more from honest
engagements with Chávez’s moral failings as we do by attending to his words and remarkable
achievements. This engagement with moral failure requires more from us than simply affirming,
“No saint is perfect.” Recent scholarly critiques of Chávez’s actions as a union leader provide
Christian ethicists, and anyone committed to advancing human equality, with opportunities to
learn about the importance of cultivating and institutionalizing democratic and accountable
leadership in our respective communities. Whereas scholars and historians of Christian ethics
have not granted sufficient attention to Chávez’s moral legacy, doing so in the present moment
provides unique opportunities to engage urgent questions of institutional ethics, enablement,
moral complicity, and communal harm reduction. Moreover, engaging Chávez’s contradictory
legacy invites us to wrestle with the ethics of our daily bread, and to understand why our daily
sustenance remains interwoven with institutionalized agricultural violence, a reality that awaits
social movements with the vision, faith, and strategy to slay Goliaths.
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